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This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak
many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak
only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for
this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. We
test our hypothesis against competing stories such as patterns of insider trading
driven by earnings announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to evade
prosecution. Finally we provide new evidence regarding crashes and the degree of
information asymmetry.
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11 INTRODUCTION
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle made clear in his celebrated \Silver Blaze" mystery that some-
times there is more to be learned from the absence of an action than from its presence.
This insight turns out very relevant in the present ¯rst study of the patterns of insider
trading preceding large movements in stock prices. Figure 1 is illustrative of the type
of phenomena we study. The ¯gure shows the sales and purchases done by corporate
managers in the 12 months preceding, respectively, the largest drop and the largest
jump in the monthly S&P 500 index during the 1986-2005 period. It can be observed
that aggregate sales by insiders peaked ten months before the drop and then went
down sharply before the drop occurred. By way of contrast, aggregate purchases by
insiders before the jump exhibit a very di®erent pattern: they remained low all year
long and picked up only the month before the jump. In the paper, we look at individual
stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ between 1985 and 2002 and ¯nd
evidence of similar patterns of insider trading preceding large events at the individual
stock level. The evidence is especially strong regarding insider sales, which runs against
the mainstream view that insider sales are almost exclusively driven by the needs for
liquidity and diversi¯cation.
[Insert ¯gure 1]
Why would insiders sell many months before a large drop but stop selling soon
before the event? There are many possible answers to this question. One view is that
many large drops in prices are due to companies failing to meet earnings expectations
and that most companies prohibit insiders from trading prior to an earning announce-
ment1. Thus, any insider who wishes to exploit private information related to poor
company earnings has to trade signi¯cantly before the actual earnings announcement
and, therefore, signi¯cantly before the crash. Another view is that insiders try to es-
1The Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988 made top management responsible
for insider trading done by any employee. This regulation encouraged companies to issue internal rules
prohibiting all trading by insiders around major corporate events, such as earning announcements or
take-over deals.
2cape scrutiny from the SEC and that the SEC investigates any trade that takes place
near the date at which the price movement occurred. A third alternative view is that
insiders are forced to trade many months before the expected price drop because of
the \short swing" rule of the 1934 Security Exchange Act that prohibits pro¯t-taking
by insiders for o®setting trades within six months2. In either case, insiders who wish
to pro¯t from their private information will optimally trade months before the date of
the actual event.
It is hard, however, to reconcile any of these views of the evidence on insider sales
with the evidence on insider purchases. Why don't we observe a similar pattern of
insider purchases prior to jumps? It is indeed the sharp asymmetry between sales
before crashes and purchases before jumps that is hard to reconcile with any theory
that treats both types of transactions symmetrically. In our view, these two types of
transactions are not symmetric because of portfolio constraints faced by insiders when
they trade on bad news. These constraints may arise for several reasons, such as short-
selling constraints3, the insider being a large shareholder who wishes to retain control
of the company, or the insider being a manager who is granted some stocks as part
of his compensation package but which he is not allowed to resale before some period
of time. In the ¯rst part of the paper we address this conjecture theoretically and
show that the presence of such portfolio constraints can explain both the occurrence
of crashes and the observed pattern of insider trading. We then test our model and
compare its predictions with those of competing stories in the second part of the paper.
The model we use is a standard noisy rational expectations model µ a la Grossman
2For an analysis of returns to insider trading based on the six months short swing rule, see Jeng
et al. (2003).
3The short selling restrictions for individual investors in the US are fairly mild and stem mostly from
the up-tick rule and from the extra cost for borrowing securities. On the other hand, the restrictions for
corporate insiders are much more stringent. Section 16c of the Securities and Exchange Act prohibits
US insiders to sell short their own stock. Furthermore, new regulations in the 1980's assure this
requirement can not be evaded by creating a similar position by trading in derivatives. Allowing
insiders to sell short would not be in the interest of shareholders as it would miss-align shareholders
and management interests.
3and Stiglitz (1980) and Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), but where trading by in-
formed traders is restricted in that their stock holdings cannot go below a given °oor.
Whenever insiders are trading, information gets incorporated into prices and prices ad-
just continuously. However, once insiders' holdings reach the °oor set by the constraint,
insiders can no longer act on further bad news. When uninformed traders observe past
trading by insiders which is consistent with their constraint being binding, they can
infer only that insiders are in possession of bad news (as otherwise insiders would be
buying the stock back) but not how bad the news really are. This deductive process
results on a sharp change in outside investors beliefs and perceived level of uncertainty.
In particular, expected payo®s fall and uncertainty (risk) rises. The combination of the
two e®ects leads to a discontinuity in the price process, that is a crash. However, to
the extent that the crash is driven by a drop in the informational content of prices and
an increase of the risk premium required by uninformed investors, it is consistent with
agents rationality and with stock market e±ciency.
This theory of crashes in asset prices exhibit two main distinctive features, which
give rise to testable implications. The ¯rst feature is that compared to normal times,
crashes occur after insiders' holdings have reached a °oor and are preceded by an
immediate period of relatively low insider trading activity. Thus, insider sales in the
immediate past should be associated to a low likelihood of a crash (since in our model
a crash occurs after the insiders have stopped trading) but insider sales in the far past
should be associated to a high likelihood of a crash (since it brings insiders closer to
the point where the \°oor" constraint binds). The second feature is that a symmetric
pattern of insider purchases, namely a period of intense purchases followed by a period
relatively low activity, does not generate a jump in the stock price. This is because
there is no \ceiling" constraint on insiders holdings to mirror the \°oor" constraint.
As mentioned earlier, the second feature is what distinguishes the testable implications
of our model with those of theories based on insiders trying to evade prosecution or
based on the short swing rule. We test our theory using a dataset similar to the one
used by Lakonishok and Lee (2001), covering the insider trading activity of companies
4traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the 1985-2002 period. The empirical
results provide strong support for both distinctive features of our theoretical model.
The results are robust to splitting the sample and to the use of di®erent estimation
techniques, di®erent measures of crashes and di®erent time periods for the insider
trading variables.
Our work is related to two lines of research in ¯nance: insider trading and stock
market crashes. A key issue in the literature on insider trading is whether insiders earn
abnormal returns on their portfolios. The answer provided by most recent empirical
analysis is that stocks purchased by insiders earn positive abnormal returns but stocks
sold by insiders do not exhibit negative abnormal returns. Lakonishok and Lee (2001)
look at abnormal returns of portfolios based on the intensity of insider purchases and
sales. After controlling for size, book to market and momentum e®ects, they ¯nd a
statistically and economically signi¯cant excess return of 4.82% for portfolios of stocks
with a strong \purchase signal". By way of contrast, the excess return of strong \sell
signals" portfolios is statistically insigni¯cant. Jeng et al. (2003) estimate the returns
to the insiders' own portfolio over a six-month window. They construct a \purchase
portfolio" that holds all shares purchased by insiders over a six month period and a
\sale portfolio" that holds all shares sold by insiders over a six month period. They
¯nd that the purchase portfolio earns positive abnormal returns of the order of 50 basis
points per month while the sale portfolio earns no negative abnormal return. Friederich
et al. (2002) and Fidrmuc et al. (2004) provide evidence based on UK data suggestive
of signi¯cantly smaller absolute price reaction to insider sales than to insider purchases.
Thus, the consensus of the existing literature when interpreting these results is that
\insider selling that is motivated by private information is dominated by portfolio
rebalancing for diversi¯cation purposes" (Lakonishok and Lee (2001))
In this paper, we provide new evidence regarding the informational content of insider
sales. Using insights from our model, we argue that the coe±cient of insider sales in
a typical regression explaining returns is theoretically indeterminate even when insider
sales are informationally driven. On the one hand, selling by insiders reveals bad news
5to the market and causes prices to go down. On the other hand, the absence of selling
by insiders can reveal even worse news (the \dog that did not bark" e®ect) and thus
cause prices to go down even more rapidly than if there had been moderate selling by
insiders. The ¯rst e®ect tends to make the coe±cient of insider sales negative while
the second e®ect tends to make it positive. In the empirical part of this paper we use
insiders sales and purchases to explain extreme returns (crashes and jumps) rather than
returns per se, as in the existing literature on insider trading. We ¯nd that insider sales
are very signi¯cantly associated with crashes, in a way both consistent with our theory
and inconsistent with the hypothesis that insider sales are solely driven by liquidity
needs.
The second branch of the literature our work is related to deals with stock market
crashes. The past few years have seen an explosion of research providing insightful
analysis of why and how crashes can occur. It turns out useful to split this literature
in two families, depending on whether crashes are associated with higher or lower
uncertainty from the point of view of uninformed traders. In the ¯rst category category
we have, ¯rst, models that view crashes as bursting bubbles4, all of which imply that a
crash brings prices closer to fundamental values. Models based on rational herding5 will
deliver a similar prediction. Finally, in this category we also have a number of models
that emphasize the role played by trading constraints, most notably Romer (1993), Cao
et al. (2002) and Hong and Stein (2003), that predict that crashes reveal information as
they are driven by informed investors who were initially out of market getting back into
the market (sidelined investors). Interestingly enough, trading constraints also play a
crucial role in models belonging to the second family, where crashes are not driven
by revelation of information but, on the contrary, by a sharp increase in uncertainty.
Models belonging to the second family comprise work by Gennotte and Leland (1990),
Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) and by Yuan (2005). Our model also belongs to this
category with two di®erences relative to the existing literature. First, from a technical
4See for instance Allen et al. (1993), Allen and Gale (2000) Allen et al. (2003) and Hong et al.
(2005)
5For instance, see Devenou and Welch (1996) for an early survey.
6point of view, we eliminate some unnecessary ingredients of existing models, such as
ad-hoc trading rules and borrowing or leverage constraints. Second, and more crucially,
we let trading by informed investors to be observable by the rest of the market. This
feature is important to bring the model to the data since we wish to identify informed
investors as insiders, whose trades are publicly observable in markets such as the US
market.
Thus, a key variable for sorting among the many di®erent views of crashes is whether
crashes are associated with informed investors getting in the market and prices becom-
ing more informative, or whether crashes are associated with informed investors getting
out of the market and prices becoming less informative. Our empirical work allows us
to shed some light on this issue in the context of the US markets in the past 20 years.
There is data available on the actual trading of one type of informed investors, namely
insiders, and we can easily construct di®erent indicators of crashes at the individual
stock level. Thus we can test whether insiders have been pulling in or out of the market
prior to a crash. The results we obtain unambiguously supports the view of crashes
associated with informed investors pulling out of the market. Indeed we ¯nd that both
insiders trading volume and insiders sales are negatively and signi¯cantly associated
with the likelihood of a crash in the following month. We also ¯nd that these two
variables are positively and signi¯cantly associated with the likelihood of a crash in the
following year. In other words, the highest likelihood of a crash is obtained when there
has been selling by insiders in the past but insiders have just pulled out of the market6
A closely related paper to our empirical analysis is the work by Chen et al. (2001).
They look at the determinants of negative skewness in individual stock returns. They
estimate negative skewness using daily returns and ¯nd that it is most pronounced in
stocks where trading volume has recently gone up and in stocks with positive returns
6A totally di®erent way to test between these two hypothesis would consist in looking at the im-
plications for expected returns. If a crash is an event that reveals information, one would expect the
risk premium demanded by uninformed investors to go down after the crash. By way of contrast, if a
crash is an event where prices reveal less information, one would expect the risk premium required by
uninformed investors to go up after the crash.
7over the past 36 months. The ¯rst ¯nding supports the view that more heterogeneity of
beliefs is conductive to crashes, as emphasized in Hong and Stein (2003). The second
¯nding is consistent with a number of models, most notably models with stochastic
bubbles. One di®erence between Chen, Hong and Stein's empirical analysis and ours
is that we use a binary indicator of crashes instead of using negative skewness. Our
results are an indication of the robustness of Chen, Hong and Stein's ¯ndings since we
also ¯nd that both past returns and the change in total trading volume are positively
associated with a higher likelihood of crashes. However, the main di®erence between
our work and Chen, Hong and Stein's is that we look not only at the impact of total
trading volume on crashes but also at the impact of insider trading on crashes, which
allows us to test whether a well-de¯ned group of investors with superior information
gets into or out of the market before a crash.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a the-
oretical model of insider trading in the presence of trading constraints. Section 3 is
dedicated to the empirical study. We ¯rst describe the data, de¯ne the variables and
explain the methodology. Then we empirically test the main predictions of the model.
We also conduct additional tests supporting our model of insiders' behavior in the
presence of trading constraints over competing stories of insiders' behavior. Finally,
section 4 is dedicated to some concluding remarks.
2 A SIMPLE MODEL OF INSIDER TRADING AND
CRASHES
In this section we de¯ne a simple environment of insider trading. The model is simple
but rich enough to identify some testable implications of insider trading activity on
asset prices. In this framework \insiders" have access to private information on asset
payo®s and can trade with uninformed traders on the basis on that information. They
can also trade due to hedging needs. All agents have rational expectations and in
equilibrium prices are partially revealing. In this simple setting we show that when
8insiders face some realistic trading constraints (such us not being able to sell short
shares of the stock) assets prices exhibit price discontinuities, or crashes. Furthermore,
the model identi¯es a very speci¯c pattern of insiders' stock holdings around those
crashes. In section 4 we test some of the predictions of this model.
2.1 The Basic Assumptions
The following setting of asset trading is a generalization of the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) model to introduce a constraint on asset holding. The other deviation from the
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) setting consists on substituting \noise" by trading arising
from agents' hedging needs7. More formally, there is an underlying probability space
(­;F;P), on which all random variables are de¯ned. A state of nature is denoted by
! 2 ­. It is further assumed that all random variables belong to a linear space N of
joint normally distributed random variables on ­. We will omit the dependance on
! whenever it does not lead to confusion. The economy lasts for one period. At the
beginning of the period agents trade in the asset market. At the end of the period all
uncertainty is resolved and agents consume the only good in the economy whose price
is normalized to one. There are two assets in the economy: a risk-free and a risky asset.
The risk-free asset has a perfectly elastic supply and, without loss of generality, o®ers
a rate of return equal to zero. The risky asset consists on shares of a company. There
is a per capita amount of n>0 shares outstanding each of which o®ers a payo® given
by the (normally distributed) random variable f : ­ ! <,
f = f + y + ²
where y and ² are normally distributed random variables and f is a constant. There
is a unit mass of traders in the economy. A fraction ¸I are \insiders" who have some
private information which is statistically related to f. In particular, each insider is in
a position that allows him to learn y, one of the components of the risky asset payo®.
Each insider is endowed with nI shares of the risky asset. The remaining fraction,
7For instance, see Marin and Rahi (2000) for some of the implications of this source of trading on
asset pricing and ¯nancial innovation.
9(1 ¡ ¸I) of agents do not receive any private information and we will often refer to
them as \uninformed" traders8. Each uninformed trader is endowed with nU shares of
the risky asset.
Agents also receive income ei : ­ ! < at the end of the period. This income can
either be interpreted as labor income or just income from holding assets which do not
have a spot market for trading. For simplicity we assume only insiders receive this type
of income. In particular:
eI = kIxIz
eU = 0
where kI is a constant, xI is a standard normal random variable uncorrelated with all
other random variables in the economy and z a normal random variable statistically
related to ² (¾²z = Cov(²;z) 6= 0). Before trading, insiders also observe the realization
of the random variable xI.
Denoting by wi the end of period wealth of agent i, by w0;i his initial wealth, by ni
the number of shares of the risky asset he holds after trading and by p the price of the
asset at time 0, we have:
wI = w0;I + kIxIz + nI(f ¡ p) (2.1)
wU = w0;U + nU(f ¡ p) (2.2)
Agents maximize the expected utility of their end of period consumption (wealth) and
behave competitively. In particular, each agent has a utility function Ui : < ! <,
which exhibits constant absolute risk aversion:
Ui(wi) = ¡expf¡aiwig
Before the market for assets trading opens, agents receive their private information.
Insiders are in possession of two important pieces of information, y and xI. The ¯rst
8Throughout this whole section 2 we denote insiders by I, uninformed traders by U, and generic
traders by i.
10one, y; is relevant for assessing the true value of the asset in the future; the second, xI,
is a key determinant of the size of the agents' hedging needs. In our model we allow
the insiders to trade one both sources of information9. Since uninformed traders do not
hold any private information, the vector s(!) = (y;xI) 2 § µ <m contains all private
information of the economy in state !. Endowed with their private information, agents
trade in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)10. In this equilibrium agents use
both their private information and the information contained in equilibrium prices, p 2
<, in the determination of their optimal asset holdings.
De¯nition 1 A REE is an equilibrium price function p(s) and a set of optimal demand
functions for insiders and uninformed traders fnI(y;xI;p);nU(p)g such that:
1) (measurability) p : § ¡! < is a (Borel) measurable function.
2) (optimality) nI(y;xI;p) and nU(p) satisfy:
nI(y;xI;p) = ArgMaxE [UI(wI) s:t: (2:1) j y;xI;p]
nU(p) = ArgMaxE [UU(wU) s:t: (2:2) j p]
3) (clearing) ¸InI(y;xI;p) + (1 ¡ ¸I)nU(p) = n
For simplicity and without any bearing on the main results, we further assume that
with the exception of ¾²z; all covariances and expectations of random variables are
equal to 0. Furthermore, all variances, except ¾2
², are set equal to 1. To summarize,
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In section 2.3 we show that when insiders face trading constraints the REE price in
9In most countries some of the trading due to y is not allowed, but trading due to xI is permitted.
In the US, all trading on y based on the the so-called \material" information is not permitted and any
trade done by insiders must be reported to the SEC.
10See Radner (1979)
11this economy exhibit crashes. Before that, and for illustrative purposes, we compute
the REE in the economy without trading constraints.
2.2 Equilibrium in the Economy without Trading Constraints
In the absence of trading constraints each agent solves a typical mean variance portfolio
selection problem. Conditional on his information, the representative insider's future
wealth is normally distributed. Taking the ¯rst order conditions, we ¯nd that his
demand for the risky asset is given by:
nI(y;xI;p) =
E (fjy;xI;p) ¡ p ¡ Cov(f;eIjy;xI;p)
aIV ar(fjy;xI;p)
=
f + y ¡ p ¡ aIkI¾²zxI
aI¾2
²
The equation above implies that equilibrium prices must reveal (to the uninformed
traders) µ(y;xI) ´ y ¡ aIkI¾²zxI, which is normally distributed. Hence, the demand
function of the representative uninformed trader is identical to that of an agent with
private signal µ(y;xI). Thus, conditional on his signal and on the inferred information,
each uninformed trader' future wealth is also normally distributed and his demand is
given by:
nU(p) = nU(µ) =
E (fjµ) ¡ p ¡ Cov(f;e2jµ)
aUV ar(fjµ)
=
µ(y;xI) + (1 + m2)(f ¡ p)
aU [m2 + (1 + m2)¾2
²]
where m ´ aIkI¾²z.
The REE price is given by:
P(y;xI) = K0 + K1µ(y;xI)
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The equilibrium price is only partially revealing as it does not reveal y to the
uninformed traders but only a linear combination of y and xI, the endowment shock
of insiders.
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2.3 Equilibrium in the Economy with Trading Constraints
We now assume that the stock holdings of all agents, both insiders and uninformed
traders, must satisfy the following portfolio constraint:
nI ¸ º
nU ¸ º
where º is a constant strictly smaller than n11.
We can decompose any equilibrium of the economy with portfolio constraints into
four regions:
² Region A where the signal received by the insiders is so good, or their hedging
motive so strong, that they purchase all the shares that the uninformed traders
can sell without violating the portfolio constraint. In that region, the portfolio
constraint of the uninformed traders is binding, the portfolio constraint of the
insider is not binding, and prices reveal µ to the market.
² Region B where the signal received by the insiders is good enough, or their hedging
motive strong enough, that they demand a larger number of shares than their
minimum holding allowed but not so good or so strong as to push the uninformed
traders out of the market. In that region, neither the portfolio constraint of the
insiders nor the portfolio constraint of the uninformed traders are binding, and
prices reveal µ to the market.
11The case º = 0 corresponds to the standard no short-sales constraint.
13² Region C where the signal received by the insiders is bad enough, or their hedging
motive weak enough, that they would want to hold a number of shares below their
minimum holding allowed but not so bad or so weak as to cause a crash. In that
region, the portfolio constraint of the insider is binding, the portfolio constraint
of the uninformed trader is not binding, and prices reveal µ to the market.
² Region D where the signal received by the insiders is so bad, or their hedging
motive so weak that not only insiders would want to hold a number of shares
below their minimum holding allowed but also a crash (i.e. a price discontinuity)
occurs. In that region, the portfolio constraint of the insider is binding, the
portfolio constraint of the uninformed trader is not binding, and prices do not
reveal µ to the market. Expected returns are higher in Region D than in either
of the other three regions.
More formally, we show in the Appendix the following result:
Theorem 1 Let:















































where f(.) and F(.) are respectively the density and the CDF of the standard normal
distribution. There exists a continuum of rational expectations equilibria to the economy
with portfolio constraints, which are characterized as follows:
i) Region A: 8µ s.t. µ ¸ µ
Prices: pa(µ) = f + µ ¡
aI¾2
²
¸I (n ¡ (1 ¡ ¸I)º)
14Holdings: nI =
n¡(1¡¸I)º
¸I ;nU = º
ii) Region B: 8µ s.t. µ > µ ¸ µ















































iii) Region C: 8µ s.t. µ > µ ¸ µ¤





Holdings: nI = º;nU = n¡¸Iº
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iv) Region D: 8µ s.t. µ < µ¤,
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Holdings: nI = º;nU = n¡¸Iº
1¡¸I .
Proof: (See Appendix)
In this economy equilibrium holdings are determined but equilibrium prices are
indeterminate (multiplicity of equilibria). A typical equilibrium is illustrated in Figure
2. The key features of any equilibrium of the economy with trading constraints are the
following:
1. Prices are discontinuous at the point µ = µ¤. In other words, a crash occurs
between Regions C and D.
2. Insiders holdings are constant in Region C. This means that a crash is preceded
by a region where insiders do not trade.
3. The trading constraint of insiders is binding in Regions C and D. In other words,
for a crash to occur insiders need to have divested in the stock.
4. Prices are continuous at the point µ = µ. In other words, a jump does not occur
when the trading constraint of uninformed investors is binding and insiders have
purchased the maximum amount of stock possible.
[Insert ¯gure 2]
153 EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this section, we document a systematic pattern of insider trading preceding large
drops in stock prices which is consistent with the qualitative properties of the model
in Section 2. We test our model against competing stories such as patterns of insider
trading driven by earnings announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to evade
prosecution. We argue that our results invalidate the mainstream view that insider sales
are solely driven by liquidity needs. Finally we provide new evidence regarding crashes
and the degree of information asymmetry.
3.1 Data, Variable De¯nitions and Methodology
3.1.1 The Data
Our tests require merging data from two di®erent sources. The Thomson Financial
Insider Filings (TFIF) database collects all insider trades reported to the SEC12. The
CRSP database provides data on returns, total trading volume and market capitaliza-
tion. We use this data to identify crashes at the ¯rm level. Our universe of securities
includes all common stocks (with CRSP share code equal to 10 or 11) that trade on
the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq markets from January 1985 to December 200213. The
procedures for selecting ¯rms and cleaning the data are taken directly from Lakonishok
and Lee (2001).
Starting with the CRSP data, we exclude observations (¯rm/month record) for
which we do not have the monthly returns. We also exclude stocks that had a price
smaller than $2 at the beginning of the calendar year in order to avoid the measurement
errors described in Conrad and Kaul (1993).
12According to Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, insiders are required to report
their trades by the tenth day of the month that follows the trading month. Reporting requirements
have tightened recently as the Sarabanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires reporting to the SEC within two
business days following the insider's transaction date.
13In addition to CRSP and TFIF, we use the COMPUSTAT database for two sets of regressions
in subsection 4.4, where earnings announcement data is necessary for testing our model against an
alternative hypothesis.
16The TFIF database comprises transactions done by three groups of insiders14:
\Management", \Large Shareholders" and \Others". Our sample contains transac-
tions done between 1986 and 200215. We eliminate ¯lings that do not match with
CRSP data. This can happen because the security does not appear in the CRSP
dataset or because it is a non-common share. From the remaining ¯lings, 889,473
correspond to open market or private sales (transaction code S), and 490,882 to open
market or private purchases (transaction code P). We focus on these transactions in
this study as they are more likely to be at least partly driven by information. The
remaining records correspond to other types of transactions, in particular grants and
awards or exercise of derivatives, which we do not include in our sample. We also ex-
clude amended records, trades for which we do not have the insiders transaction price
nor the closing price of the stock, and small transactions where less than 100 shares
were traded. Finally, some ¯llings in which the reported transaction price is not within
20% of the CRSP closing price on that day, or that involves more than the 20% of the
number of shares outstanding are eliminated to avoid problematic records. After this
cleansing process and after merging the insider trading dataset with the ¯ltered CRSP
dataset, our sample contains 1,183,457 records. From those, 799,890 are sales, and
383,567 are purchases, which are distributed as follows: 979,467 transactions done by
\Management", 185,096 done by \Large Shareholders" and 18,894 done by \Others".
3.1.2 Crash variables
The ¯rst step in our empirical analysis consists in identifying crashes at the individual
stock level. Both our model and the data available put a number of constraints at this
14The \Management" group includes those transactions done by the chairman, directors, CEOs,
CFOs, o±cers, presidents, vice presidents, a±liates, members of committees, etc. The \Large Share-
holders" group includes those equity-holders (direct shareholders, indirect shareholders and bene¯cial
owners) who own more than 20% of shares and are not management. Finally, the transactions by the
rest of insiders (for example, founders or former managers) are classi¯ed as \Others".
15The Lakonishok and Lee (2001) study covers the period 1975 to 1995. So our dataset misses some
of the earlier observations but focuses on the later period where insider trading has been relatively
more active.
17stage:
1. In our model, insider trading matters because it is observable to market partic-
ipants and these update their beliefs as insiders' trades, or lack of trades, are
observed. In reality, prior to the Sarabanes-Oxley Act of 2002, there could exist
a gap of a few days to a few weeks between the date at which the trade took place
and the date at which it is reported. While one can reasonably expect that the
information about the insiders' trades becomes available to market participants
at some point between these two dates, it seems di±cult for us to take a harder
stance about the speed of revelation of information. This leads us to conduct our
empirical analysis at a monthly frequency.
2. While insiders have private information about their own company, they do not
necessarily have valuable information about the evolution of the entire market.
Thus, if insider trading and crashes are related at the individual stock level, they
must be for crashes driven by idiosyncratic shocks and not for crashes driven by
market-wide corrections. Consequently, our measure of crashes at the individual
stock level should correct for moves of the aggregate market.
3. Our theoretical model has sharp testable implications about the patterns of in-
sider trading prior to a crash. However, it does not have similar implications
regarding expected returns or conditional skewness16. The model does not pro-
vide restrictions about the size of the crash when a crash occurs either17. Thus,
if we are to take our model seriously we must de¯ne a crash as a binary variable
(either a crash occurred or it did not occur) and test whether patterns of insider
trading can predict the probability of a crash.
Taking into account these restrictions, we construct our ¯rst baseline variable for a
crash in stock i in month t, ERCRASHi;t, as follows. We ¯rst compute the series of
16In particular, before a crash occurs, expected returns are the same no matter the pattern of insider
trading.
17This is because of the multiplicity of equilibria in our model.
18monthly excess returns for each stock, rER
i;t ´ ri;t ¡rm;t, where ri;t is the raw return of
stock i in month t and rm;t the monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market
portfolio. Then for each observation (stock/month) we compute the mean excess return,
¹ rER
i;t , and the standard deviation of excess returns, ¾ER
i;t , over a rolling window of the










Our second baseline variable for a crash, MMCRASHi;t, is constructed in a similar
fashion, except that excess returns are constructed by taking the di®erence between the
stock's monthly return and its estimated return in a market model regression. That
is, we de¯ne, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), where ¯i;t is the beta of the stock
estimated over a sixty months window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. We then compute
the standard deviation of the residuals of the market regression, ¾MM











To check the robustness of our results with respect to our de¯nition of crashes18, we
also compute another measure of crashes, RAWCRASHi;t, which is constructed in the
same way as the other two measures of crashes but using raw returns instead of excess
returns or residuals from the market model. As can be expected, the three measures of
crashes are fairly close to one another. Figure 3 represents the number of crashes per
year over the 15 years of our sample according to each measure. Table 1 provides the
sample correlation between the three measures of crashes. As could be expected, both
Table 1 and ¯gure 3 show a strong positive correlation between our three measures of
crashes, especially between ERCRASH and MMCRASH. Note also that according
to all three measures, the post 1996 period has the largest number of crashes19.
18Robustness checks of the main regression are provided in subsection 3.2.3
19Another way of checking how closely related the three measures are is looking at the monthly
threshold return required by the alternative de¯nitions for a crash to happen. The median of this




i;t and ri;t, respectively.
19[Insert table 1]
[Insert ¯gure 3]
Finally, as we want to compare patterns of insider trading prior to crashes to pat-
terns of insider trading prior to jumps, where by \jump" we mean a large positive price
movement, we construct the variables ERJUMPi;t, MMJUMPi;t, RAWJUMPi;t.
Each of these four variables is de¯ned in a totally symmetric fashion as their crash










Figure 4 represents the number of jumps per year according to each measure and
Table 2 provides the sample correlation between these three measures of jumps. We
observe that our three measures of jumps are even more strongly and positively corre-
lated with one another than in the case of crashes. We also observe a sharp increase in




Independent variables fall in two categories: variables suggested by our model and
variables suggested by the existing literature. Variables suggested by our model mostly
consist in di®erent measures of insider trading. In our empirical study, insider trading
includes all private or public market purchases and sales done by all categories of
insiders. We do not include grants and exercises of options as they are less likely to
be driven by information. To homogenize the insider trading variables across stocks
and across time, we normalize them by dividing the dollar value of each particular
trade by the market capitalization of the stock, computed using the closing price of
the day of the transaction. The main variables we use are: insider sales, INSSAL,
and insider purchases, INSPURCH. A ¯rst subscript, i, refers to the individual
stock considered. The variable may then have one or two time subscripts. If there is
20only one time subscript, then the variable refers to trades that took place during the
corresponding month t. Thus INSSALi;t gives the total amount of insider sales on
stock i during month t. If there are two time subscripts, then the variable refers to the
monthly average between the two time subscripts. Thus INSPURCHi;t¡1;t¡12 gives
the average monthly amount of insider purchases on stock i between month t ¡ 1 and
month t¡12. In addition to these two basic categories of variables, we de¯ne composite
variables such as insider trading volume, INSTV , which is de¯ned as insider sales plus
insider purchases.
Table 3 provides summary statistics on aggregate insider trading activity in our
sample. Figure 5 represents the evolution of insider purchases and sales over time. An
important point to note from ¯gure 5 is that insider transactions, and most notably
insider sales, have been much larger in the 90's than in the 80's. This observation
suggests that ¯ndings regarding correlations between insider activity and crashes may
be sensitive to the choice of sub-sample. In subsection 3.2.3 we address this issue.
[Insert table 3]
[Insert ¯gure 5]
Independent variables suggested by the existing literature include trading volume
and past returns. First, Chen et al. (2001) have shown that total trading volume (i.e.
both by insiders and outsiders), which we thereafter note as TTV , is a strong predictor
of negative skewness, a concept very much related to crashes. Their interpretation of
the results, consistent with the Hong and Stein (2003) model, is that TTV acts as
a proxy for the dispersion of opinions across investors. When interpreting our own
results we want to make sure that trading volume by insiders does not act as a proxy
for TTV . Thus we include TTV , at the same frequency as our insider trading variables,
in all our regressions. Similarly, the cumulative excess return over the equally weighted
market portfolio of the past two years, ERt¡1;t¡24 is likely to matter for two reasons.
First, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) have shown that insiders are contrarian investors.
If valuable information about crashes is contained in insider trading, it is likely to be
contained in the unexpected component of insider trading. Thus, to the extent that
21past returns predict insider trading, we want to include the variable in our regression.
Another reason for including past returns is the ¯nding by Chen et al. (2001) that past
returns can predict negative skewness. Finally, our main regressions allow for ¯rm and
year e®ects20.
3.1.4 Methodology
The binary nature of our dependent variables raises some estimation concerns. There
are three leading estimation procedures for regressions with a binary dependent vari-
able: the linear probability model (OLS), and the logit and probit models. Each proce-
dure has some defects: with the linear probability model, estimated probabilities may
lie outside the [0,1] interval and disturbances are heteroskedastic. With logit and pro-
bit, coe±cients of group dummy variables cannot be estimated and the interpretation
of coe±cients is less straightforward than with the linear probability model.
To the extent that our objective is not as much to get an estimate of the probability
of a crash as to test whether or not insider trading patterns are correlated with crashes
and jumps, we use the linear probability model in our main regressions. Since we know
that using the linear probability model will give rise to heteroskedasticity and since
we can also suspect problems of auto-correlation, we report signi¯cance of coe±cients
based on Newey-West standard errors. As a robustness test, we also estimate our
leading regressions using logit and probit and report the results in subsection 4.3.
3.2 Empirical Results
In the introduction we established a dichotomy in the literature that view crashes as
a phenomenon that arises because of the existence of trading constraints. Models like
Romer (1993), Cao et al. (2002) and Hong and Stein (2003) share the property that
crashes occur when previously sidelined informed investors get back into the market.
Our model, like Gennotte and Leland (1990), Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) and by Yuan
20An example of ¯rm's characteristics that may have an impact on crashes is size as suggested by
Chen et al. (2001)
22(2005), has the opposite property: crashes occur when informed investors get out of
the market. Before testing speci¯c implications of our model, we want to check more
generally whether the data favors or not the type of models ours belongs to. Despite
the wealth of theoretical models on crashes there has been so far, to the best of our
knowledge, no attempt has been made to ask the data the simple question: Do informed
investors get into or out of the market before a crash?
3.2.1 Preliminary result: Sidelined investors vs. the dog that did not bark
To answer the previous question we run regressions of our two baseline measures of
crashes, ERCRASHi;t and MMCRASHi;t against insiders trading volume as the mea-
sure of insider trading activity. In particular we regress our measures of crashes on the
past month trading volume by insiders INSTVi;t¡1 and the average monthly insiders
trading volume in the past year, excluding the last month21, INSTVi;t¡2;t¡12. We also
include the past two years cumulative excess returns ERi;t¡1;t¡24 and the total trading
volume (by both insiders and outsiders) of the past month TTVi;t¡1. Fixed month and
¯rms e®ects are allowed for through mean-di®erencing.
Table 4 presents the results of these ¯rst two regressions. Column 1 presents the
results for ERCRASHi;t and column 2 for MMCRASHi;t. The results are conclu-
sive on the relationship between crashes and insiders activity: there is a negative and
signi¯cant (at the 1% level) correlation between current insiders trading volume and
the probability of a crash. Furthermore crashes are positively correlated with far past
trading volume (although the coe±cient is not signi¯cant in the case of crashes accord-
ing to the MMCRASH de¯nition). Our empirical result is clear in its task of sorting
among theories of crashes in the presence of trading constraints. It establishes that a
crash is more likely to occur when insiders are getting out of the market than when
they are getting back into the market. If any, increased insiders trading activity is
associated with crashes in the far future. The result thus supports the general class of
21The choice of a one year window is arbitrary. However, results based on a di®erent choice of horizon
are qualitatively similar to the ones presented here.
23theories of crashes our model belongs to.
[Insert table 4]
Finally, the variables ERi;t¡1;t¡24 and TTVi;t¡1 are also strongly signi¯cant and
of the same sign as found in the existing literature, most notably Chen et al. (2001).
The fact that INSTVi;t¡1 is negatively correlated with the probability of a crash when
controlling for the previous two variables is also relevant as it dispels any suspicion
that our insider trading variables may play the role of a proxy for total trading volume.
Indeed, insider trading volume over the past month is negatively correlated with the
probability of a crash while total trading volume is positively correlated, and in both
cases the coe±cients are signi¯cant at the 1% level.
3.2.2 Baseline regression: insider sales and crashes
In this section we directly test the empirical implications of our theory of asset crashes.
The main implication of the model in section 2 is that a crash occurs in a region
characterized by insiders being short-sale constrained. In order for insiders to be short-
sale constrained they must have sold shares in the past. So, the main prediction of the
model is that nearby sales by insiders must be negatively correlated with the probability
of a crash while far away sales must be positively correlated.
To test this hypothesis we regress our measures of crashes, ERCRASHi;t and
MMCRASHi;t, against sales by insiders in the past month INSSALi;t¡1 and the
average sales by insiders in the past year, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12. We also include the past
two years cumulative excess returns ERi;t¡1;t¡24 and the total trading volume (by both
insiders and outsiders) of the past month TTVi;t¡1. Fixed year and ¯rms e®ects are
allowed for through mean-di®erencing. Formulating regressions in this fashion presents
three advantages:
1. Our model still has predictions for the sign of the coe±cients. On the one hand,
the sign of INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 should be positive since, ceteris paribus, more sales
by insiders in the past bring them closer to the point where the constraint is
binding and increases the probability of a crash. On the other hand, the sign of
24INSSALi;t¡1 should be negative since a crash is supposed to occur after insiders
have stopped trading.
2. The alternate hypothesis provided by a standard static e±cient market model
without constraints can also be tested. The coe±cient of INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12
should not be signi¯cant since it is a variable which was public information
by month t ¡ 1 (taking the most conservative stance about when the trades
were reported by insiders and the di®usion of information). The coe±cient of
INSSALi;t¡1 should either be non signi¯cant or positive, again depending on
the speed of reporting and of di®usion of information.
3. These regressions allow us to test whether the market believes that valuable
information is contained in insider sales. Indeed, if it were not the case, as
suggested by the existing literature on insider trading, then none of the coe±cients
of the insider sales variables should come up signi¯cant.
Table 5 contains the results of the regression of crashes on sales. In the ¯rst column
crashes are de¯ned using excess returns over the market portfolio; in the second column
crashes are computed using residuals from the market model. For both regressions,
coe±cients of the insider sales variables are statistically signi¯cant. As argued above,
this ¯nding is in very sharp contrast with the conclusion of the existing literature
on insider trading that insider sales are mostly driven by liquidity. Second, we ¯nd
that the signs of each coe±cient correspond to the predictions of our model and do
not correspond to the predictions of a \standard" e±cient market model: the sign
of INSSALi;t¡1 is negative, which can only be reconciled with a \standard" e±cient
market model if insiders were selling when the risk of a crash is lowest while it is
fully consistent with our \Dog that did not bark" theory. Similarly, the sign of the
INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 variable is positive which is consistent with our interpretation that
crashes occur when insiders' holding get close to the point where their short-selling
constraint is binding.
[Insert table 5]
25The strong statistical signi¯cance of the insiders sales variable is in sharp contrast
with an important literature that has argued that insiders purchases, rather than sales,
are the only insiders' transactions with an informational content and the source of
pro¯table trading rules. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examines insider trading activity
of companies traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the 1975-1995 period.
After controlling for size, book to market and momentum e®ects, they ¯nd a statistically
and economically signi¯cant excess return of 4.82% for portfolios of stocks with a
strong \purchase signal" but at the same time ¯nd a positive but statistically non-
signi¯cant coe±cient for strong \sell signals". Jeng et al. (2003) estimate the returns
to the insiders' own portfolio over a six-month window. They construct a \purchase
portfolio" that holds all shares purchased by insiders over a six month period and a
\sale portfolio" that holds all shares sold by insiders over a six month period. They
¯nd that the purchase portfolio earns positive abnormal returns of the order of 50 basis
points per month while the sale portfolio earns no negative abnormal return. Friederich
et al. (2002) and Fidrmuc et al. (2004) provide evidence based on UK data suggestive
of signi¯cantly smaller absolute price reaction to insider sales than to insider purchases.
Thus, the consensus of the existing literature is that \insider selling that is motivated by
private information is dominated by portfolio rebalancing for diversi¯cation purposes"
(Lakonishok and Lee (2001).
The empirical evidence reported in table 5 is consistent with a few other possible
explanations, apart from our model. One possible explanation is the fact that insiders
are unlikely to trade on sensitive short-lived information. This is because insiders
trading on information want to escape scrutiny from the SEC and the SEC is likely
to investigate any trade by insiders that took place a few days before a crash. The
absence of trading on short-lived information could also arise because of the \short
swing" rule of the 1934 Security Exchange Act that prohibits pro¯t-taking by insiders
for o®setting trades within six months. A second possible explanation has to do with
earning announcements. Indeed, many large drops in prices are due to companies failing
to meet earnings expectations and we know that most companies prohibit insiders from
26trading prior to an earning announcement. Thus, our ¯nding that crashes are preceded
by a drop in selling by insiders could potentially be a pure artefact driven by calendar
e®ects.
We shall go back to the earnings announcement explanation in subsection 4.4 where
we test it explicitly against our model. However, testing the \no trading on short-
lived information" story against our model can easily be done at this stage. Indeed,
another implication of our model is that while continuous sales by insiders followed by
a period of no selling may drive a crash because of the short-sale constraint, continuous
purchases followed by a period of no buying will not drive a jump. Indeed, the absence
of a \ceiling" constraint explains that there is no jump in Region A. Thus, we should
not expect insider purchases to become signi¯cant if we run the symmetric regressions
for jumps. By way of contrast, the \no trading on short-lived information" story is
perfectly symmetric: whether it is for avoiding prosecution by the SEC or because
of the six months short swing rule, traders should abstain from trading on short-live
positive information the same way as they do with negative information.
In table 6 we present the results of regressions where we run ERJUMPi;t and
MMJUMPi;t against the past month purchases by insiders INSPURCHi;t¡1 and the
average purchases by insiders in the past year INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 (excluding the
last month's). As before, we include the past two years cumulative excess returns
ERi;t¡1;t¡24, total trading volume (by both insiders and outsiders) of the past month
TTVi;t¡1 as well as year and ¯rm dummies. We observe that the results of the jump
regressions are consistent both with our model and with the predictions of a standard
e±cient market hypothesis: the coe±cient of INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is statistically in-
signi¯cant while the coe±cient INSPURCHi;t¡1 is positive and signi¯cant22. They
are however inconsistent with any of the alternate explanations of the crash regressions.
The main message of this section is that any theoretical model trying to explain the
patterns of insider trading prior to crashes also has to come to grip with the absence
22The lack of signi¯cance of the coe±cient associated with INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is not
driven by multicolinearity considerations as the correlation between INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 and
INSPURCHi;t¡1 is just 0.01.
27of similar patterns prior to jumps.
[Insert table 6]
3.2.3 Robustness Checks
We now proceed to check the robustness of our base regressions. We want to check
the robustness of our results with respect to sample period, estimation technique and
de¯nition of the variables, both dependant and independent.
As mentioned in Subsection 3.1.3, and illustrated in Figure 5, insider trading, as a
fraction of market capitalization, has increased sharply in the mid 90's. This opens up
the question of how robust our results are to the choice of sample period. We split our
sample into two sub-samples, one covering the period 1986-1995 (low insider trading)
and the other the period 1996-2002 (high insider trading) and run the base regressions
on the two separate sub-samples. Table 7 reports the results for the leading regressions
for each subperiod. As could be expected given the relative activities of insider trading
in the two periods, results for the earlier period are less strong than for the later period.
Nevertheless, results are supportive of our theory. For the 1986-1995 period, all insider
trading variables in the crash regressions are of the right sign predicted by the theory
even though, to one exception, they lose signi¯cance. Also, the asymmetry between
crashes and jumps is preserved: high insider sales in the previous month lower the
probability of a crash while high insider purchases raise the probability of a jump. As
expected, results for the 1996-2002 period are strongly supportive of our theory: all
insider trading variables are of the right sign and signi¯cant at the 1% level (to one
exception, which is only signi¯cant at the 5% level).
[Insert table 7]
Our next sequence of checks deals with the estimation technique. For simplicity
and ease of interpretation, we estimated the base regressions using a linear probability
model. In Tables 8 and 9 we report results of similar regressions using, respectively,
a logit and a probit model23 to specify the probability of a crash. The results of
23Both sets of regressions include year dummy variables whose coe±cients are not reported in the
28the regressions are quite encouraging. When crashes are de¯ned using simple excess
returns, all insider trading variables are of the right sign and signi¯cant, both with the
logit and with the probit speci¯cations. Also, as in all our regressions, the asymmetry
between crashes and jumps is preserved. When crashes are de¯ned using a market
model, results are less strong. The good news for our theory is that the \dog that did
not bark" e®ect remains signi¯cant: under both speci¯cations, higher insider sales in
month t¡1 lowers the probability of a crash in month t. Also, the asymmetry between
crashes and jumps is again preserved. However, the \long term" insider sales variables
becomes totally insigni¯cant (and of the wrong sign)
[Insert table 8]
[Insert table 9]
Our ¯nal robustness check concern the way we constructed our crash variables as
well as our insider trading variables. We ¯rst check if the 1-year window for insiders
activities preceding large price movements is critical for the results. In table 10 we
report the regression results for two alternative windows: six months and 24 months.
In these regressions the near past variable remains as in the baseline regression (one
month), but the far past variables goes back to months t ¡ 6 and t ¡ 24. The results
are at least as strong as the ones in the baseline regressions: the coe±cients have the
right sign and (to one exception) are very strongly signi¯cant. The \dog that did not
bark" e®ect is present for crashes and absent for jumps, as predicted by the theory.
[Insert table 10]
Finally, in table 11 we report the results of the base regressions but using a de¯nition
of crashes and jumps based on raw returns, rather than returns in excess of the CRSP
equally weighted market portfolio or the returns predicted by the market model. To the
extent that our model is not a model of market-wide crashes, we expected the results
of this regression to be considerably noisier than when adjustments for market changes
are being made. The results are consistent with our expectations: the \long-term"
insider trading variable remains of the right sign and signi¯cant at the 1% level but
tables.
29the "short-term" variable is insigni¯cant (and of the wrong sign).
[Insert table 11]
The overall picture we draw from these robustness tests is that the e®ects we identi-
¯ed in the previous section seem to be quite robust. In most of the alternate speci¯ca-
tions we tried, both insider trading variables remained of the right sign and signi¯cant
for the crash regressions. In some regressions, one of the variables stopped being sig-
ni¯cant but never two at the same time, nor did we observe a coe±cient coming with
the wrong sign and even mildly signi¯cant. Finally, the asymmetry between crash and
jump regressions, which we argued earlier is one of our most striking ¯ndings remains
present in all alternate speci¯cations.
3.2.4 Crashes and Earning Announcements
The last item we have so far left aside concerns the alternative interpretation of our
results based on the possible coincidence of crash dates and earnings announcement
dates. According to that hypothesis, there may be a large proportion of crashes that
take place during months where an earning announcement takes place, because of the
company's earnings failing to meet the market's expectations. To the extent that
insiders are prevented from trading their own company's stock for a few weeks prior to
the earning announcement, it is natural to see crashes associated with low trading by
insiders the previous month. Thus, if the alternate hypothesis is correct, the correlation
between crashes and insider trading is a pure artefact driven by calendar e®ects, and
the absence of trading by insiders contains no valuable information for outsiders.
In order to test our hypothesis against this alternative hypothesis, we merge our
data set with information from COMPUSTAT regarding earnings announcements. We
eliminate all observations for which we do not have data regarding earnings announce-
ment dates for that stock and that year. We then construct a sub-sample with only
observations (stock/month) where no earning announcement was made for that stock
during that month. We then run the base regressions for that sub-sample.
The results, reported in Table 12, are unambiguous: all coe±cients of insider trading
30variables for the crash regressions are signi¯cant at the 1% or at the 5% level and of
the right sign predicted by the theory. By way of contrast, none of the insider trading
variables are signi¯cant for the jump regressions, which con¯rms our earlier ¯ndings of
the crash/jump asymmetry.
[Insert table 12]
To further con¯rm the interpretation of our results, we perform one last test: we
run the base regressions on the sub-sample where all observations correspond to a
month where an earning announcement took place. To the extent that insider trading
is strongly regulated for most ¯rms around these periods, both in terms of purchases
and of sales, uninformed traders should not be able to draw any inference, either
positive or negative, from the pattern of insider trading around those dates. Thus, if
our theory that the pattern of insider trading around crashes is driven by informational
considerations is correct, then insider trading variables should stop being signi¯cant in
the sub-sample. The results we report in table 13 support that hypothesis: not only
insider sales the month before stop being signi¯cant, which is expected given that there
is very little insider trading around earning announcement dates, but average insider
sales of the previous year stop being signi¯cant as well.
[Insert table 13]
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Insider trading and crashes in asset prices are among the ¯nance concepts that have
historically attracted the largest amount of attention, both in the academic arena and
among practitioners. In this paper we introduce a theoretical framework that relates
them in a novel fashion. The model we develop in this framework points at a clear
pattern of insiders selling intensity preceding crashes (high in the far past and low in
the near past) with no symmetric counterpart in the case of insiders purchases and
jumps. Our empirical study shows that the evidence in the US markets is consistent
with all the model predictions. These results highlight an informative role of insiders
sales completely ignored in the literature.
31We believe this paper sets the starting point in a new way of thinking about insider
trading and crashes. As such, it leaves many questions unanswered and open lines for
further research. First, it would be interesting to see if equity or options portfolios based
on the sequence of insider sales our model suggests exhibit abnormal performance. It
would also be interesting to perform a more disaggregate analysis sorting our sample
according to ¯rm characteristics (such as size) that we think are correlated with the
intensity of the diversi¯cation motive for insider sales in each of the ¯rms. This would
allow us to concentrate in a speci¯c segment of the market in which ex-ante we should
expect our results to be stronger (weaker) because of a smaller (larger) noise introduced
by noninformationally driven insider sales. Finally, from an international perspective,
it would be interesting performing the same tests performed here across countries with
di®erent insider trading regulations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Region A. From the study of the unconstrained economy, we have that the demand
of the representative insider is given by:
nI(y;xI;p) = Max
µ












n ¡ (1 ¡ ¸I)º
¸I
since º < N.
It can easily be checked that any price p > p(µ) corresponds to one and only one
µ. Thus prices reveal µ in Region A and, as seen in the study of the uncostrained
economy, the demand of the uninformed traders is given by:
nU(p) = Max
µ















A = º if µ ¸ µ
Thus, the market clearing condition is satis¯ed in Region A.
34Region B. The derivation of equilibrium prices and equilibrium holdings in this
region is identical to that of the equilibrium of the economy without portfolio
constraints. The restriction that equilibrium holdings need to be larger than º
for both types of agents provides the condition µ > µ ¸ µ
Region C. For insiders, we have as before:
nI(y;xI;p) = Max
µ















² (1 ¡ ¸I)(1 + m2)
;º
!
= º if µ 6 µ
It can easily be checked that any price p such that p(µ) > p > p(µ¤) corresponds
to one and only one µ. Thus prices reveal µ in Region C and, from the study of
the unconstrained economy, the demand of the uninformed trader is given by:
nU(p) = Max
µ














since º < N. Thus, the market clearing condition is satis¯ed in Region C.
Region D. We ¯rst need to show that t¤ is well de¯ned. First notice that the LHS
of equation (2.3) is a continuous function of t and that its limit when t ! +1 is
equal to +1. Applying L'Hospital rule twice, one can show that the limit of the
LHS of equation (2.3) when t ! ¡1 is equal to ¡1:Thus, equation (2.3) has at
























For insiders, we have as before:
nI(y;xI;p) = Max
µ






35The last expression follows from the fact that µ¤ 6 t¤ implies:





































Notice that the equilibrium price is constant in Region D and di®erent from the
equilibrium price in any of the other three regions. Indeed, it is easy to show that








































where, x ´ µ¤
p




Since f(¢) and F(¢) are the density and the CDF of the normal distribution, re-
spectively, it is immediate that x+
f(x)











. This proves that pc(µ¤) > p¤.
Therefore observing the equilibrium price of Region D, P(µ) = p¤ is equivalent
to observing that µ < µ¤:Thus the expected utility of an uninformed agent who
observes the equilibrium price in Region D can be written as follows:

























































µ¤ + aUnU p
1 + m2
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´ + P ¡ f + aU(1 + ¾2
²)nU = 0
It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium prices and holdings given in the





































































(a) Managers sales before October, 1987




























































(b) Managers purchases before January,
1987 (Largest S&P 500 \jump" in period
1986-2002)
Figure 1: Managers transactions before large market movements.
This graphs show the evolution of managers¶ open market or private trades in common stocks traded in NYSE,
AMEX and Nasdaq that appear in the CRSP dataset, before the largest market movements in the S&P 500
during the 1986-2002 period. The data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings
dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider
trading records, transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price
was not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that day, or that involved more than 20% of the number of
shares outstanding. We consider as managers the chairman, directors, CEOs, CFOs, o±cers, presidents, vice
presidents, a±liate persons, members of committees, etc. % of Total Market Capitalization is de¯ned as 100
times the value of all the managers trades during the month (number of shares traded times the transaction
price or the closing price of the day if the transaction price is missing) divided by the total market value of our























































Figure 2: Equilibrium prices and insider holdings.
This ¯gure displays a parametric example of the equilibrium (prices and holdings) described in Theorem 1
resulting in a 10% crash. The parameter values are: aI = 1, aU = 0:4, ¸I = 0:3, n = 10, ¾2
² = 50, º = 9:90,
¾2



























1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ERCRASH MMCRASH
RAWCRASH
Figure 3: Number of crashes over time.
The ¯gure reports the evolution of the aggregate number of crashes for common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX
and Nasdaq that appear in CRSP dataset, excluding stocks with a price smaller than $2 at the beginning of























1; if ri;t ¡ ¹ ri;t · ¡2¾i;t ;
0; otherwise.
where: rER
i;t ´ ri;t¡rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t¡(rf;t+¯i;t(rm;t¡rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t
is the monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated
over a sixty-month rolling window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER;MM;;, denote the sample
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ERJUMP MMJUMP
RAWJUMP
Figure 4: Number of jumps over time.
The ¯gure reports the evolution of the aggregate number of jumps for common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX
and Nasdaq that appear in CRSP dataset, excluding stocks with a price smaller than $2 at the beginning of























1; if ri;t ¡ ¹ ri;t ¸ 2¾i;t ;
0; otherwise.
where: rER
i;t ´ ri;t¡rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t¡(rf;t+¯i;t(rm;t¡rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t
is the monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated
over a sixty-month rolling window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER;MM;;, denote the sample









































































































































































(c) Insider transactions: average fraction of
¯rm's market capitalization
Figure 5: Evolution of insider trading activity.
These ¯gures show the evolution over time of several measures of aggregate insider trading activity. Panel (a)
plots the average number of sales and purchases per month and ¯rm, and includes companies without any trading;
panel (b) the total monthly dollar value of insider sales and purchases expressed in terms of 1995 million dollars;
panel (c) the average monthly fraction of insider sales and purchases to company market capitalization, where
market capitalization is computed using the closing price of the day of the trade. The sample consists of insiders
open market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial
Data Fillings dataset. We exclude stocks with a price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year,
amended insider trading records, transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported
transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that day,or that involved more than the 20%
of the number of shares outstanding.
42A.3 Tables




RAWCRASH 0.5291 0.4906 1
The table reports the correlation matrix for the number of crashes for the period 1987-2002, for common stocks
traded in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq that appear in CRSP dataset, excluding stocks with a price smaller than























1; if ri;t ¡ ¹ ri;t · ¡2¾i;t ;
0; otherwise.
where: rER
i;t ´ ri;t¡rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t¡(rf;t+¯i;t(rm;t¡rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t
is the monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated
over a sixty-month rolling window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER;MM;;, denote the sample
mean and standard deviation of the corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window.




RAWJUMP 0.7429 0.7003 1
The table reports the correlation matrix for the number of jumps for the period 1987-2002, for common stocks
traded in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq that appear in CRSP dataset, excluding stocks with a price smaller than























1; if ri;t ¡ ¹ ri;t ¸ 2¾i;t ;
0; otherwise.
where: rER
i;t ´ ri;t¡rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t¡(rf;t+¯i;t(rm;t¡rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t
is the monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated
over a sixty-month rolling window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER;MM;;, denote the sample
mean and standard deviation of the corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window.
44Table 3: Insider trading activity: summary statistics.
Large
Management Shareholders Others Total
Purchases
Fraction 0.483 0.052 0.013 0.501
# of Trades 2.927 0.845 0.052 3.824
Tot Million $ $1,891 $2,482 $94 $4,467
% Mkt Cap 0.213% 0.168% 0.008% 0.388%
Sales
Fraction 0.509 0.088 0.031 0.531
# of Trades 6.838 1.000 0.136 7.975
Tot Million $ $24,045 $13,394 $783 $38,222
% Mkt Cap 0.561% 0.348% 0.023% 0.932%
This table presents some summary statistics on aggregate insider trading activity. Fraction, shows the average
fraction of ¯rms with at least one insider trade per year; # of Trades, is the average number of sales or purchases
per year and ¯rm, and includes companies without any trading; Tot Million $ is the average of the annual dollar
value of insider trades per year expressed in terms of 1995 million dollars. % Mkt Cap is the ratio of the average
of the value of insiders trades per company and year to market capitalization in percentage terms, where market
capitalization is computed using the closing price of the day of the trade. The sample consists of insiders open
market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq
markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data
Fillings dataset. We exclude stocks with a price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended
insider trading records, transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction
price was not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that day, or that involved more than the 20% of the
number of shares outstanding.














Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In columns 1 and 2 we report the results obtained in the following two preliminary regressions for crashes:
ERCRASHi;t = ®i + °t + ¯1INSTVi;t¡1 + ¯2INSTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ¯3ERi;t¡1;t¡24
+¯4TTVi;t¡1 + ¯4TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ²i;t
MMCRASHi;t = ®i + °t + ¯1INSTVi;t¡1 + ¯2INSTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ¯3ERi;t¡1;t¡24
+¯4TTVi;t¡1 + ¯4TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ²i;t
where i and t are indexes for the company and the calendar month, respectively. In the estimation we use the Newey-West




















i;t ´ ri;t ¡ rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the
monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling
window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSTVi;t¡1
is the past month trading volume by insiders in stock i, INSTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average trading volume by insiders in stock i in
the past year (excluding the previous month), TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the
average total trading volume in stock i in the past year (excluding the previous month) and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is stock`s i cumulative
excess return over the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample consists of insiders open
market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq markets that
appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings dataset. We exclude
stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records, transactions involving
less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that
day, or that involved more than the 20% of the number of shares outstanding.














Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In columns 1 and 2 we report the results obtained in the following two leading regressions for crashes:
ERCRASHi;t = ®i + °t + ¯1INSSALi;t¡1 + ¯2INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 + ¯3ERi;t¡1;t¡24
+¯4TTVi;t¡1 + ¯4TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ²i;t
MMCRASHi;t = ®i + °t + ¯1INSSALi;t¡1 + ¯2INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 + ¯3ERi;t¡1;t¡24
+¯4TTVi;t¡1 + ¯4TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ²i;t
where i and t are indexes for the company and the calendar month, respectively. In the estimation we use the Newey-West




















i;t ´ ri;t ¡ rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the
monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling
window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSSALi;t¡1
are the past month insiders' sales in stock i, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders sales in stock i during the period
t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading volume
in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally
weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases
from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on
insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at
the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records, transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in
which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that day, or that involved more than the
20% of the number of shares outstanding.














Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In columns 1 and 2 we report the results obtained in the following two leading regressions for jumps:
ERJUMPi;t = ®i + °t + ¯1INSPURCHi;t¡1 + ¯2INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12
+¯3ERi;t¡1;t¡24 + ¯4TTVi;t¡1 + ¯4TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ²i;t
MMJUMPi;t = ®i + °t + ¯1INSPURCHi;t¡1 + ¯2INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12
+¯3ERi;t¡1;t¡24 + ¯4TTVi;t¡1 + ¯4TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 + ²i;t
where i and t are indexes for the company and the calendar month, respectively. In the estimation we use the Newey-West




















i;t ´ ri;t¡rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t¡(rf;t+¯i;t(rm;t¡rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the monthly
return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling window
and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the corresponding
k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSPURCHi;t¡1 are the
past month insiders' purchases in stock i, INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders purchases in stock i during the
period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading
volume in stock i during the period t¡12 to t¡2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally
weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases
from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on
insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at
the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records, transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in
which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that day, or that involved more than the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































49Table 8: Robustness checks: the logit model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





ERt¡1;t¡24 -0.010 -0.003 -0.280** -0.265**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012)
TTVt¡1 0.234** 0.194** 0.367** 0.305**
(0.040) (0.034) (0.045) (0.039)
TTVt¡2;t¡12 -0.619** -0.002 -0.878** -1.098**





Observations 789658 789658 789658 789658
Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In this table we report the estimation of the logit version of our leading regressions for crashes and jumps. In the estimation
we only allow for year e®ects and use the Newey-West standard errors to control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The






































i;t ´ ri;t ¡ rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the
monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling
window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSSALi;t¡1
are the past month insiders' sales in stock i, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders sales in stock i during the period
t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, INSPURCHi;t¡1 are the past month insiders' purchases in stock i, INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average
of the insiders purchases in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 , TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in
stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading volume in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is
stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample
consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings
dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records,
transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP
closing price on that day, or that involved more than the 20% of the number of shares outstanding.
50Table 9: Robustness checks: the probit model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





ERt¡1;t¡24 -0.006* -0.002 -0.105** -0.102**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006)
TTVt¡1 0.136** 0.111** 0.192** 0.162**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020)
TTVt¡2;t¡12 -0.261** 0.000 -0.398** -0.488**





Observations 789658 789658 789658 789658
Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In this table we report the estimation of the probit version of our leading regressions for crashes and jumps. In the estimation
we only allow for year e®ects and use the Newey-West standard errors to control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The






































i;t ´ ri;t ¡ rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the
monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling
window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSSALi;t¡1
are the past month insiders' sales in stock i, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders sales in stock i during the period
t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, INSPURCHi;t¡1 are the past month insiders' purchases in stock i, INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average
of the insiders purchases in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 , TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in
stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading volume in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is
stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample
consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings
dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records,
transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In this table we report the equivalent to tables 5 and 6 (leading regressions for crashes and jumps, respectively) but using a
de¯nition of crashes and jumps based on raw returns rather than returns in excess of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio
or the returns predicted by the market model. As before, in the estimation we allow for ¯xed ¯rm and year e®ects and use the












1; if ri;t ¡ ¹ ri;t ¸ 2¾i;t ;
0; otherwise.
In these expressions we have: ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, ¹ ri;t and ¾i;t, denote the sample means and stan-
dard deviations of the raw return and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables:
INSSALi;t¡1 are the past month insiders' sales in stock i, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders sales in stock i
during the period t¡12 to t¡2, INSPURCHi;t¡1 are the past month insiders' purchases in stock i, INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is
the average of the insiders purchases in stock i during the period t¡12 to t¡2 , TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume
in stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading volume in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24
is stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample
consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings
dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records,
transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP
closing price on that day, or that involved more than the 20% of the number of shares outstanding.
53Table 12: Leading regression when no earning announcements.
Not Earning Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4)









ERt¡1;t¡24 0.001** 0.001** -0.006** -0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TTVt¡1 0.015** 0.012** 0.015** 0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
TTVt¡2;t¡12 -0.005 0.009** -0.066** -0.050**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 463395 463395 463395 463395
Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In this table we report the results of the estimation of our leading regression for crashes and jumps when these do not take place
in an earning announcement month. As before, in the estimation we allow for ¯xed ¯rm and year e®ects and use the Newey-West







































i;t ´ ri;t ¡ rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the
monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling
window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSSALi;t¡1
are the past month insiders' sales in stock i, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders sales in stock i during the period
t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, INSPURCHi;t¡1 are the past month insiders' purchases in stock i, INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average
of the insiders purchases in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in
stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading volume in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is
stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample
consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings
dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records,
transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP
closing price on that day, or that involved more than the 20% of the number of shares outstanding.
54Table 13: Leading regression when earning announcements.
Earning Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4)









ERt¡1;t¡24 0.002** 0.003** -0.008** -0.007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
TTVt¡1 0.018** 0.017** 0.022** 0.019**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
TTVt¡2;t¡12 -0.002 0.009+ -0.085** -0.069**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 224993 224993 224993 224993
Standard errors in parentheses
+ signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
In this table we report the results of the estimation of our leading regressions for crashes and jumps when these do take place in an
earning announcement month. As before, in the estimation we allow for ¯xed ¯rm and year e®ects and use the Newey-West stan-






































i;t ´ ri;t ¡ rm;t, rMM
i;t ´ ri;t ¡ (rf;t + ¯i;t(rm;t ¡ rf;t)), ri;t is the raw return of stock i in month t, rm;t is the
monthly return of the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio, ¯i;t is the beta of the stock estimated over a sixty-month rolling
window and rf;t is the risk-free rate. ¹ rk
i;t and ¾k
i;t, k = ER; MM; ;, denote the sample mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding k variable and are computed using a ¯ve-year rolling window. Regarding the independent variables: INSSALi;t¡1
are the past month insiders' sales in stock i, INSSALi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average of the insiders sales in stock i during the period
t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, INSPURCHi;t¡1 are the past month insiders' purchases in stock i, INSPURCHi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average
of the insiders purchases in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2, TTVi;t¡1 is the past month total trading volume in
stock i, TTVi;t¡2;t¡12 is the average total trading volume in stock i during the period t ¡ 12 to t ¡ 2 and ERi;t¡1;t¡24 is
stock`s i cumulative excess return over the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio for the previous two years. The sample
consists of insiders open market or private sales and purchases from 1986 to 2002 in common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq markets that appear in CRSP dataset; the data on insider transactions comes from Thompson Financial Data Fillings
dataset. We exclude stocks with price smaller than $2 at the beginning of each calendar year, amended insider trading records,
transactions involving less than 100 shares, and ¯llings in which the reported transaction price was not within 20% of the CRSP
closing price on that day, or that involved more than the 20% of the number of shares outstanding.
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